Human infants exhibit a number of behaviors that have been interpreted as evidence of an early ability to represent and reason about mental states (theory of mind). We reconsider these behaviors in light of evolutionary theory concerning parent-offspring conflict. We speculate that some of them, which intuitively appear to provide evidence of rich social understanding, may in fact reflect a history of selection for behaviors that only appear to be generated by such an ability. We hypothesize that infants were selected to have adult social behavioral resemblances in order to extract higher levels of parental and caretaker i nvestment. We suggest that, all other things being equal, parents will invest more in infants who exhibit behaviors similar to their own, especially when the behaviors lead to attribution of a high degree of infant social understanding. Parents will invest more because this apparently increased social understanding will generate higher degrees of attachment between parent and infant.
Parental Investment and Parent-Offspring Conflict
The theoretical underpinnings of parental investment strategies were first worked out by Trivers (1974) , who realized that the different genetic interests of parents and their offspring can account for behavioral conflicts between the two. From Hamilton's (1964) landmark work on inclusive fitness, Trivers (1974) Because social mammals typically reproduce more than once, and because they typically invest a substantial amount of resources in caring for their young after birth, parents must seek some way of limiting investment in any given infant. Simply put, too much energy investment in a current infant may be at the expense of the production and care of future or r elated infants (or kin). Trivers showed that the optimal amount of investment in a current infant can be understood as a mathematical function which maximizes the chance that the infant will survive to the point at which it can reproduce, but minimizes costs to potential future infants (or closely related kin). In contrast to parental efforts in minimizing investment, the infant should favor increases in parental investment. Examples of the conflicts that emerge from the partial asymmetry of interests between infant and parents are widespread (for a classic study with non-human primates, see Altmann, 1980) . Presumably, weaning conflict has evolved precisely because of the differential interests of the mother and the infants. Maestripieri (2002) has recently reviewed the literature in this area and argues that parent-offspring conflict remains an important and valuable explanatory framework in primate biology.
In humans, evidence of parent-offspring conflict can be seen even before birth.
First, up to half of all pregnancies end in spontaneous abortions, abortions which may be due to the mother's physiological evaluation of the fetus (Gaulin & McBurney, 2001 ). Second, the normal physiological relationships between the fetus and mother Parent-offspring Conflict 3 3 may reflect such conflict. Haig (1993) , for example, considered mother-fetus conflicts in which the fetus attempts to manipulate maternal physiology for its own benefit, and the maternal physiology responds to counteract these manipulations. Examples of fetal manipulations include actions that reduce the probability of miscarriage, actions that increase nutrient supply in maternal blood, and actions that increase the duration of pregnancy. Each of these manipulations, while providing direct benefits to the fetus, can be problematic for the mother. When the fetus is of low fitness value, reducing the probability of a miscarriage is advantageous only to the fetus. Increased nutrient supply in maternal blood also benefits the fetus, but extreme variations of blood sugar (for example) may produce gestational diabetes in the mother.
Additionally, increases in the duration of pregnancy, while providing more resources to the fetus, can be dangerous to the mother due to increased size of the infant at term.
Thus, even before birth, infants may engage in a parental conflict over investment (in this case, with their mother). Trivers (1974) anticipated the application of parent-offspring conflict for understanding the evolution and ontogeny of infant cognitive skills. In describing the infant as a "psychological manipulator" (p. 257), Trivers noted that the asymmetry in physical size between the parents and infants has selected infants to deploy psychological tactics in order to induce parents to provide higher levels of investment than they have been selected to give. He noted that once a system of "honest" communication has evolved between the infant and its mother about the infant's immediate needs, ...the infant can begin to employ it out of context. The offspring can cry not only when it is famished but also when it merely wants more food than the parent is selected to give. Likewise, it can begin to withhold its smile until it has gotten its way. Selection will then of course favor parental ability to discriminate the two uses of the signals, but still subtler mimicry and deception are always possible (p. 257).
Infant Cognitive Development in Light of Parent-offspring Conflict
Parent-offspring Conflict 4 4 It is important for our purposes here to note that Trivers used this logic to explain parent-offspring conflict that is widespread among species that provide investment in their offspring after birth.
Two additional points should be made in relation to Trivers' observations. First, the domains of parent-offspring conflict within a species would presumably become f airly well-defined over time. That is, there would be some circumscribed arenas in which the evolutionary dance of the appearance of new infant behavioral strategies, followed by the emergence of adult counter-strategies, would continue.
Within these arenas, there would be a continual tweaking of such strategies, but the basic arenas in which this evolutionary cycle would go on should be relatively fixed until some further changes were introduced into the behavioral repertoire of the species (for other reasons) -modifications that enabled infant, parent, or both to exploit this new behavioral arena. To anticipate, we suggest below that the emergence of theory of mind in the course of human evolution was one such a modification.
Another point in relation to Trivers' (1974) argument should be made. At least two different means of parental exploitation are available. Trivers emphasized that infants would exploit parental resources by behaving in a manner less mature, and thus in need of more resources, than their chronological age would suggest. For example, a child might use a strategy of crying to obtain more food or attention. As a young infant is "more helpless and vulnerable … its parents will have been more strongly selected to respond positively to signals of need emitted by the offspring, the younger that offspring is" (Trivers, 1974, p. 257) or appears to be. Of course, it is also highly likely that age-related changes in crying may have been selected for in order to maximize investment. However, there are clearly limits on the use of such a strategy, even at ages in which some crying may be beneficial. Experimental research has
shown that exposure to the sight and sound of crying increases various indicators of stress-induced arousal in adult observers, and can increase frustration and aggression (Donovan & Leavitt, 1985; Donovan, Leavitt, & Balling, 1978; Murray, 1985; Frodi & Lamb, 1980) . Thus, although some degree of crying is likely to extract a higher degree of parental investment, extreme crying may also place infants at risk. For example, crying is the most widely cited cause of "shaken baby syndrome" (Becker, Liersch, Tautz, Schlueter, & Andler, 1998; Dykes, 1986) and may be the "primary reason for aggression" directed at children under two years o f age (see Norman, 1983 (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977) , in the social smiling of their two-month-old (Wolff, 1963) , or in the speech-like vocalizations of their three-month-olds (Beaumont & Bloom, 1993) . Such behaviors may lead to parental attribution of a high level of social understanding to the infant and, in combination with other factors (e.g., breast feeding; see review in DiGirolamo, Grummer-Strawn, & Fein, 2001) , increase the degree of attachment between caregiver and infant (Klaus, Kennell, & Klaus, 1995) . By producing behaviors that lead to positive regard and affect, and increasing the attachment between caregiver and infant, the infant's behaviors can reduce the very real possibilities of suffering neglect, abuse, or abandonment (Klaus & Kennel, 2001; Sameroff & Chandler, 1975) , and t hus these strategies for recruiting resources have quite different limits than those faced by immaturity-based strategies. Indeed, the emotional regard and attachment generated by these behaviors may constitute a core basis for caregivers providing additional resources. With the initial onset of theory of mind in early humans (see next section of this paper), the potential for more complex relationships started.
Infants now could generate behaviors tapping into this increased social understanding and form a ttachment bonds that could increase their chance of surviving to maturity given this new psychological environment. This strategy for recruiting resources may be successful in large part because of the lack of overt conflict. By bonding with the parent, the child makes it more difficult for the parent to give him or her fewer resources.
Evolution of Social Understanding in Humans: New Strategic Fodder for

Infants
In what follows, we outline our hypothesis that the evolution of the human capacity for reasoning about mental states (theory of mind) opened up a new arena in the ongoing parent-offspring conflict. The evolutionary emergence of theory of mind may have provided infants with a new avenue for recruiting additional parental investment.
Once parents began to respond to the psychological states of their infants, in addition to their overt behavioral states, infants could begin to evolve behaviors that would, in effect, manipulate this ability for their own benefit.
Parent-offspring Conflict 6 6 We assume (based on our assessment of the current evidence) that the capacity to reason about mental states evolved sometime after the separation of humans from other hominoids, but it is important to note that our hypothesis does not depend upon this inference. Even if the time-frame we advocate turns out to be incorrect (that is, if theory of mind abilities are more widespread than we believe), this would only mean that humans exhibit simply an example of a more widespread phenomenon.
Nonetheless, it is important to make some assumption about the timing of the evolution of theory of mind in order to explain how it was integrated into earlier psychological systems. We recognize that this claim is controversial and so we direct our readers' attention to other authors who believe the evidence supports a wider distribution of this ability in living primates or other taxa (e.g., Hare, Call, Agnetta, & Tomasello, 2000; Hare et al., 2000; Boesch & Boesch-Achermann, 2000; Call & Tomasello, in press; Suddendorf & Whiten, in press ).
Our current conclusion that theory of mind is restricted to our species does not imply that only humans exhibit complex social behaviors; indeed, many social species produce behaviors which, on the surface, resemble behaviors often associated in our species with the functioning of theory of mind. Certain complex social behaviors seem especially elaborated in primates, especially in chimpanzees (e.g., deception, gaze-following, reconciliation and 'holding grudges' after fights: Whiten & Byrne, 1988; Goodall, 1986; de Waal, 1 982, 1986 de Waal, 1 982, , 1989 Povinelli & Eddy, 1996a; Tomasello, Call, & Hare, 1998) .
Some scholars will wonder how chimpanzees and other non-human animals could lack an understanding of mental states when they share with us so many of the behaviors which, in humans, we would interpret as prima facie evidence of the ability to represent mental states. We have offered one possible solution to this apparent problem: namely, that the connection between our representation of each other's mental states and our overt behavior is far more complex than introspection suggests (e.g., Povinelli & Giambrone, 1999 , 2000 Povinelli & Prince, 1998) . In short, many behaviors which our folk psychology tells us are being generated by inferences about what others are thinking or feeling, may in fact have multiple causes, and furthermore, many of these behaviors may have originally been supported by psychological systems unrelated to theory of mind. Gaze-following is an excellent case in point.
Although we are certainly capable of attending to and following the gaze of others as a consequence of wondering what it is that they see, it is not at all clear that this is Parent-offspring Conflict 7 7 always or even usually the proximate cause of gaze-following in adult humans.
Recent research hints at the operation of precisely such a dual system of responding to gaze in humans adults (e.g., Driver, Davis, Ricciardelli, Kidd, Maxwell, & BaronCohen, 1999; Kingstone, Friesen, & Gazzaniga, 2000; Langton & Bruce, 1999) . The general point is that systems which enable reasoning about the behavior of others and its relationship to other observable events may often suffice.
Based on the above line of thinking, we have argued that the ability to reason about mental states evolved as a unique specialization of the human species, and its initial function was to give us the ability to understand and generate ancient, alreadyexisting behaviors in novel ways -not to endow us with a multitude of fundamentally new behaviors (for detailed descriptions of this hypothesis, see Povinelli & Giambrone, 1999 , 2000 Povinelli & Prince, 1998) . In short, the initial selective advantage of theory of mind was for greater flexibility in combining and recombining old behavioral patterns. The psychological system for representing the mental states of others may therefore reside alongside (and interact in complicated ways with) more ancient systems for keeping track of and reasoning about the behavior of others. The significance of this framework is that it leads one to expect, a priori, that chimpanzees and humans would share numerous, nearly identical behavioral patterns, and yet understand them differently (with chimpanzees reasoning strictly about the behavioral propensities of others, and humans reasoning about both behavioral propensities and mental states). In our view, this is what the experimental data suggest. Because this interpretation holds that humans evolved a cognitive specialization that allowed our species to interpret existing behaviors in new ways, we have referred to it as the 'reinterpretation' hypothesis.
The reinterpretation hypothesis has two important implications for the model that we are proposing. First, it suggests a particular evolutionary time-point for the emergence of a new arena for parent-offspring conflict in ancestral hominoids: the evolutionary appearance of theory of mind. If theory of mind is a novel (or even largely novel) specialization of the human lineage, then this addition to the parentoffspring conflict occurred sometime after the split of humans and chimpanzees.
Second, just as chimpanzees may engage in behaviors like deception without appreciating how they connect to the underlying mental states of others, so too may human infants. For example, when a 2 -month-old infant smiles in response to her mother gazing at her, this smile may not be driven by sophisticated social recognition may be the result of a finely honed evolutionary strategy in which smiling yields more investment.
Parent-offspring Conflict and the Evolution of Behavioral 'Imposters'
We use the term 'imposter' to indicate a sub-class of behaviors exhibited by human infants that evolved to exploit the human adult's theory-of-mind system. When a parent attributes a high degree of social understanding to their infant, there are several possible psychological bases for the infant's behaviors. On the one hand, the infant's behaviors might indicate the presence of precisely the kind of social understanding attributed to him or her by the parent. At some point in development, most children will develop the ability to explicitly reason about mental states, because the child will develop the same social understanding that is modally present in human adults.
Conversely, the parent's attribution could be incorrect. A given behavior exhibited by the infant, while appearing to result from an ability to reason about mental states, could instead be caused by other psychological systems. Because of their purported evolutionary history, we label these latter class of behaviors as 'imposters.' These proposed 'imposters' are, of course, ontogenetic adaptations (Oppenheim, 1981) , or transient processes enabling an infant to adapt to particular stages of development.
Only when viewed through the lens of progression to more adult-like or mature states are these 'imposters' really imposters. Below, we propose three ways in which such 'imposters' could have originated through selection on infants to act like they possess a theory of mind, without necessarily having the ability to represent mental states. In each case, the evolution of the infants' behavior is being driven by the ability to extract additional levels of parental investment.
(1) Neurological substrates for the behavior were present in the infants of the common ancestor of humans and the African apes; however, human infants evolved subtle alterations in these behaviors once a developmental pathway in humans was established for representing mental states and hence allowing adults to (incorrectly) construe these behaviors in terms of the infants ability to reason about mental states (for example, by shifting the behaviors earlier and earlier into development).
Parent-offspring Conflict 9 9 (2) Specific neurological substrates for the behavior were not present i n the infants of the common ancestor of humans and the African apes, but rather, the evolution of a theory of mind in adult humans led to the evolution of some entirely novel behaviors in infancy.
(3) Finally, the neurological substrates were present in the infants of the common ancestor of humans and African apes, but they subserved a different function. Once human adults began to evolve a theory of mind, some behaviors (e.g., smiling) could be interpreted very differently by human parents, and were therefore evolutionarily modified by infants to gain additional resources based on this new parental interpretation.
Below, we examine some infant behaviors which may be outcomes of the three processes isolated above.
Gaze-following
Certain aspects of gaze following in early infancy may have been shaped by the first process. Human infants, starting at 6 months or younger, develop an ability to follow the gaze of others (e.g., Scaife & Bruner, 1975; Butterworth & Jarrett, 1991; Corkum 10 earlier and earlier in development. Further, and consistent with both the first and third mechanism identified above, infants may have also evolved subtle alterations in their behaviors related to gaze following. For example, they may have begun to yoke affective expressions with gaze alternations from t he parent to other objects of interest, leading to parental attributions of higher levels of social awareness. In this case, infants would have preserved the general function of their behavior, but tweaked it to maximize resource investment. Because gaze-following is present in many social primate species, and therefore must have a shared ontogenetic trajectory, its form in human infancy is an imposter only to the extent that selection may have shaped its specific expression precisely so that it would more readily trigger the adult theory-ofmind system.
Indexical Pointing
Pointing in infancy may be an example of a behavior that arose through the second process. Indexical pointing occurs in very young infant humans, who spontaneously display early forms of 'pointing' by extending their index fingers from their otherwise closed fist (Hannan & Fogel, 1987) . However, even by 5 months, the index finger extensions of human infants is not coordinated with their gaze direction towards adults or objects in the world (Hannan & Fogel, 1987) . In contrast, by 12 months pointing involves extension of the arm, use of the index finger, and gaze coordination with another person (e.g., Franco & Butterworth, 1996) , with infants looking in the general direction of another's pointing gesture (e.g., Morissette, Ricard, & Décarie, 1995) . By about 15 months of age, infants are able to precisely localize the intended targets of the pointing gestures of others (Morissette et al., 1995; Lempers, 1979) .
Pointing by young infants may be well characterized as "proto-imperative" (Bates, Camaioni, & Volterra, 1975) , involving an infant instrumentally using a parent (see also Mosier & Rogoff, 1994) . Although chimpanzees raised with humans do develop whole arm, hand, and even index finger extensions towards objects that they want when interacting with humans (review by Leavens & Hopkins, 1999) , they do not use such gestures with each other, and there is substantial reason to suppose that they do not understand that the gesture connects to the m ental states of others (review Povinelli, Bering, & Giambrone, in press ). Indeed, the conspicuous absence of pointing in free-ranging chimpanzees (e.g., Plooij, 1978) , is perhaps best highlighted by the ambiguity of the single published instance of a possible example of pointing by Parent-offspring Conflict 11 11 chimpanzees in the 40 years this species has been intensively studied in its natural habitats (Vea & Sabater-Pi, 1998) . (Interestingly, specialization of the action of the tendons of the index finger that may be relevant to the t opographical form of the gesture have been noted in humans as compared to chimpanzees; see Povinelli & Davis, 1994) .
We interpret the lack of pointing behavior in chimpanzees and other great apes to indicate that the behavior of pointing was not present i n the common ancestor of humans and the great apes. Rather, it appears to have evolved exclusively in the human lineage. We propose that pointing in young human infants evolved after adult 
Social Smiling
Finally, early social smiling may be an example of a behavior that arose through the third process we described above. Social smiling emerges in young human infants at around 2 months of age. It is produced when the infant views the face and eyes of an observer, and also appears related to the contingency of the observer's behavior with the child's behavior. Young infants inspect a face presented to them, then focus on the eyes of the observer, and break out suddenly "into a broad smile or grin" and "this sequence of events [can] be repeated many times" (Wolff, 1963, pp. 122-123) . Prior to 4 to 6 weeks, infants will smile to some external stimuli, and also to some internal stimuli (e.g., light touches and during REM sleep, Emde & Koenig, 1969) . From f our to six weeks through to approximately six months, the most effective stimuli for evoking smiling in the infant is a moving 'en face' approximate configuration of the face (Spitz & Wolf, 1946) . Infants of this age vary their smiling based on stimulus features including eye-gaze (Symons, Hains, Muir, 1998; Hains & Muir, 1996a ) and contingency (Hains & Muir, 1996b; Tronick, Als, Adamson, Wise, & Brazelton, 1978; Watson, 1972) . Chimpanzees and other nonhuman primates display facial gestures which resemble b are teeth smiles, but the social function of these gestures 12 differs radically from the function of smiling in humans. Often, these facial displays indicate fear or submission (van Hooff, 1972) .
We suggest that a specific behavioral substrate for smiling w as present in the common ancestor of humans and other great apes, but once social smiling in adults began to have meanings such as appeasement, expression of empathy, acknowledgement, and attraction, infants began to utilize smiling as a facial gesture to ingratiate themselves in their parents' eyes.
Other Candidate Behaviors
Thus far, we have considered only a handful of behaviors which human infants may display in the absence of the mature, folk psychology that typically accompanies their production in older humans. Table 1 lists a number of additional behaviors that might be productively analyzed using the general framework outlined here. Thus, although some researchers have interpreted the behaviors listed in Table 1 as evidence that infants represent aspects of the mental states of others, it is possible that some of these behaviors may be supported by other kinds of representations -ones not specifically involved in reasoning about mental states per se. After all, if our general model is correct, the initial selective advantages that led to the sculpting of new social behaviors in infants (and/or the modification of existing ones) resulted from the fact that these behaviors elicited increased levels of parental investment, regardless of whether those behaviors reflect sophisticated social understanding or not.
Behavioral Imposters vs. Early Theory of Mind: A Comparison of Explanatory Frameworks
It is important to note that even if the proposal advanced here has merit, the new aspects of parent-offspring conflict which may have been opened up by the evolutionary emergence of theory of mind, could have led to selection pressures on human development. These pressures could have selected for continually earlier (if more fragile) manifestations of genuine social understanding related to theory of mind, as opposed to selection for imposters alone. For example, it might be the case that what was canalized was a general representational code linking self and other -as proposed, for example, by Meltzoff and Gopnik (1993; see also Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997) . According to these authors, the existence of neonatal imitation of the sort demonstrated by Meltzoff and colleagues (e.g., Meltzoff & Moore, 1977 Parent-offspring Conflict 13 13 suggests that human infants begin life with a system of abstract cross-modal representation providing them with an experiential similarity in their representations of self and other. With this system, they are "launched on their career of interpersonal relations with the primary perceptual judgement 'Here is something like me'" (Meltzoff & Gopnik, 1993, p. 336 Decety, Chaminade, Grezes, & Meltzoff, 2002; Goldenberg, 2001; Iacoboni, Woods, Brass, Bekkering, Mazziotta, & Rizzolatti, 1999; Nishitani & Hari, 2000) . The involvement of the inferior parietal and frontal opercular areas in gestural imitation is consistent with reports that both areas represent orofacial and upper limb movements, and both areas are known to be responsive when subjects view or execute movements ( Buccino, Binkofski, Fink, Fadiga, Fogassi, G allese, Seitz, Zilles, Rizzolatti, & Freund, 2001 ). Nonhuman primates appear to possess parietal and frontal areas homologous to those that support imitation in humans (Johnson, 2002; Preuss, 1995; Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998) , and these areas contain matched motor and visual representations of movement. Cells with such coincident visual and motor properties have been dubbed "mirror neurons" (Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996) . These areas are also strongly interconnected (review by Wise, Boussaoud, Johnson, & Caminiti, 1997) . It is worth remembering, however, that the ability to intentionally copy observed movements is Parent-offspring Conflict 14 14 quite limited in species other than humans, and therefore the parietal and frontal territories that support adult-like imitation must be have been recently modified in human evolution.
If adult imitation depends critically on the cortical structures discussed above, then it is unlikely that neonatal and adult imitation share the same substrates, if only because human cortex is very immature at birth. This immaturity is manifest in many aspects of anatomy and physiological organization, including synaptic density, dendritic elaboration, myelination, electrical activity, and metabolic activity (Albert, Diamond, Fitch, Neville, Rapp, & Tallal, 1999) . It is conceivable that the specific cortical structures and circuits involved in adult imitation follow an accelerated developmental schedule relative to neighboring areas, but there is no evidence of this.
It seems more likely, on neurobiological grounds, that neonatal imitation is supported by different mechanisms than adult imitation, and specifically by subcortical systems, which are more mature at birth than cortical systems (Johnson, 1990) . One structure that should be considered in this role is the superior colliculus (cf. Johnson, 1990 ).
Although often treated by primate neuroscientists merely as an eye-movement center, it is substantially more than that: the colliculus contains spatially matched visual, auditory, and somatosensory maps, providing a basis for multimodal sensory integration (Kaas & Huerta, 1988; Sparks & Nelson, 1987) . Moreover, in addition to eye movements, it organizes movements of the mouth, face, and forelimbs (Dean, Redgrave, & Westby, 1989; Werner, 1993) . The superior colliculus receives projections from parietal and frontal cortex in nonhuman primates (Fries, 1984) ; assuming that similar connections are present in humans, these could provide the basis for the transition of the control of imitation to cortical systems as the latter mature. Of course, given that there is no solid evidence that nonhuman primates exhibit neonatal imitation, our suggestion that the colliculus is involved in human neonatal imitation implies that aspects of this structure were functionally modified during hominid evolution. Likewise, we must assume that the cortical structures involved in adult imitation were modified, as nonhuman primates are not specialized for the intentional copying of observed movements.
Whatever the exact mechanisms supporting neonatal imitation, our model posits a history of selection for neonates and infants that expressed behaviors superficially resembling later-developing behaviors (i.e., true imitation). In the context of facial imitation, such behaviors may have been especially important given Parent-offspring Conflict 15 15 the relatively greater amount of face-to-face interactions in human development (as opposed to developmental patterns found in other primates) -a difference that may itself be a byproduct of the evolution of theory of mind during the course of human evolution. Thus, infants who reacted to adult facial expressions with gestures that were structurally matched and temporally coordinated, would be likely to receive higher levels of attribution of social awareness, and hence more and earlier investment. We emphasize that our behavioral imposters are not necessarily fixedaction-patterns (cogently argued against by Meltzoff and colleagues). Indeed, our model does not deny that neonatal imitation is a process of 'active intermodal mapping', and thus can account for the diversity of evidence gathered in this area (e.g., Meltzoff & Moore, 1997) . Instead, it posits that this mapping occurs in subcortical systems, not in the cerebral structures that seem to be involved in the kinds of imitation seen in older infants, children and adults. In contrast, Meltzoff and Gopnik (1993) seem to posit a continuity of cortical functions from birth forward, our account posits the functioning of multimodal, but subcortical representations at birth, which are integrated with cortical systems later in development. Thus, whereas both accounts acknowledge the common coding of visual and motor information at birth in humans, our model questions whether the mere expression of this common coding in overt behavior (through imitation) warrants the attribution of any kind of intentional understanding on the part of the infant (for a related account of neonatal imitation, also see Bjorklund, 1987) . Interestingly, however, if our model is correct, the neonatal system for imitation may have been exquisitely designed to yield precisely such attributions by our naïve folk psychology.
At this point, one might argue that the sheer diversity of evidence for early suggests that the long-term outcome of this evolutionary arms race was to select for the increasingly earlier development of sophisticated social understanding. In other words, parent-offspring conflict may have favored infants who developed theory-ofmind-like abilities earlier in development. Some evidence which could be used to bolster this view is presented in Table 2 . It should be noted that this evidence has been gathered in the context of efforts to explicitly test predictions concerning alternative ideas about the kinds of social understanding present in infancy.
However, it could be the case that despite such targeted analyses, researchers are actually uncovering the very areas in which infants were selected to detect and respond to the statistical regularities that exist in the actions of their caregivers. The detection and use of these regularities does not necessarily imply a system for understanding mental states, but it might provide the means by which they could maximally exploit their caregivers. That there are statistical regularities in the behavior of others is not particularly controversial; indeed, it can be shown that not only must such regularities exist, they must be detectable in social species who use such information in their interactions with each other (see Povinelli, 2001 ). In the case of human infants, some researchers are now uncovering such abilities (Baird & Baldwin, 2001) . That these regularities are detectable by infants may not be, from the perspective we have outlined here, altogether surprising. For one thing, such a system for statistically-based parsing of action may be phylogenetically quite old (and thus unrelated to theory of mind). Furthermore, to the extent that there was additional selection pressure on infants during h uman evolution to act as if they possessed a mentalistic type of social understanding, then infants might have further elaborated upon this ability. They might have latched onto a specific class of regularities in the behavior of their caregivers that could be exploited -ones precisely coinciding with the intentional parsing of action made by our adult folk psychology (Baird & Baldwin, 2001 ).
Of course, one might counter that such heretofore unnoticed competences on the part of infants -competences that were only discovered by the application of procedures designed to probe for intentional understanding in infancy (see Table 2 ) -by themselves show that infants' understanding goes beyond what would be needed to exploit parents into providing more investment. After all, the abilities revealed by the research summarized in Table 2 may not be detectable by parents as they interact with their infants. Conversely, however, one could argue that selection for behaviors that Parent-offspring Conflict 17 17 could be noticed by parents (the ones described above, and perhaps many of those listed in Table 1 ), might have carried with them precisely some of the ancillary skills developmental psychologists are now uncovering (e.g., see Table 2 ). It is also possible that more sophisticated research with parents may reveal that they do detect these subtle aspects of behavior without being aware that they do so.
Compounding the problem is the likelihood that at least two systems, or perhaps more precisely, two kinds of systems, may be operating in parallel in adult humans: one for detecting the statistical regularities in the behavior of others, and another system which maps intentional ascriptions onto that behavior (see Povinelli & Giambrone, 2000; Povinelli & Prince, 1998 ; from a human developmental point of view, see Baird & Baldwin, 2001 ). The difficulty arises in that independent of any selection for human infants to either actually understand (or act as if they understand) the intentional states of others, socially competent primates will have already evolved systems for detecting and analyzing many of the statistical regularities that exist in the behavior of others -precisely those regularities, in fact, upon which humans now map their intentional understandings (see Povinelli, 2001; Baird & Baldwin, 2001 ). If it is the case that such systems for detecting and using the fine-grained regularities in the behavior of the self and others existed long before theory of mind systems evolved, then it may be aspects of these systems, not the ones for reasoning about mental states, that were canalized earlier and earlier in human development in the manner predicted by parent-offspring conflict theory.
Future Directions and Conclusions
Parent-offspring conflict theory suggests that as a new system for social understanding (the ability to explicitly represent mental states) emerged in human evolution, a new arena for parent-offspring would have been opened, and human developmental systems would have responded in predictable ways. For example, competences for g enuine social understanding might have been dragged earlier into ontogeny. Alternatively, other systems, which would lead infants to be perceived as if they possessed such competences, might have been modified or pulled earlier into development as well. Finally, some complex combination of the two processes might have occurred.
The framework we have outlined here adds to the already-existing list of possible explanations of behavioral patterns in infancy which resemble in important here is that far more data need to be rallied, and especially data that have some hope of testing the hypothesized causal relationships between antecedent behaviors in infants and later developments in social understanding and theory of mind.
Our proposal might be extended by considering the possibility that theory of mind, although a specialization of the human species, appeared only gradually during the course of human evolution, or in a step-wise increments. We speculate that the emergence of even the earliest components of theory of mind in adults would have established the kind of selection pressures on human infants that we have discussed.
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